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TECHNOLOGICAL RISK AND ISSUE
PRECLUSION: A LEGAL AND
POLICY CRITIQUE
Meiring de Villiers t
This article presents a legal and policy analysis of issue preclusion
in product liability litigation. The analysis shows that application of of-
fensive collateral estoppel to preclude liability constitutes an abridge-
ment of a fundamental right, and should therefore be subject to strict
scrutiny. The major public policy interests of collateral estoppel to be
weighed in a strict scrutiny calculus are decisional consistency and judi-
cial economy. In fact, offensive collateral estoppel has an ambiguous
causal connection with decisional consistency and may actually under-
mine it. Furthermore, analysis of constitutional jurisprudence shows that
the fundamental right at issue may not be rationed or compromised to
promote a purely economic interest. Based on these considerations, the
offensive use of collateral estoppel to preclude liability does not pass the
strict scrutiny test of constitutionality. Policy implications of this analy-
sis include limitations on full faith and credit recognition and enforce-
ment of product liability judgments across state lines.
INTRODUCTION
Any technology is inherently risky. A software package may con-
tain a virus that causes a nuclear plant to malfunction; an automobile gas
tank may explode upon impact; and a drug may have adverse side effects
even while it provides the only technologically feasible cure for a
dreaded disease. The law of product liability does not require perfect
product safety, but recognizes that society's best interests are served
when an "optimal" level of safety is achieved.1 Liability for product
t Assistant Professor, Department of Management Science & Engineering, Stanford
University. Ph.D. (Economics), Stanford University, 1997; J.D., Stanford University, 1995. I
am grateful to Seymour ("Sy") Goodman, Gregory Grove, Kenneth Scott, James Sweeny,
Robert Weisberg, and the editors of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy for helpful
comments and suggestions. This work was financially supported by the U.S. Department of
Defense and the Center for Research in Information Security and Policy ("CRISI"), at Stand-
ford University.
I See RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LA.mLrrY § 2 (Proposed Final Draft
1997) ("Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe ... any more than it
benefits from products that are too risky. Society benefits most when the right, or optimal,
amount of product safety is achieved.").
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defectiveness is imposed when the riskiness of a product exceeds a legal
standard of safety and causes personal injury or damage to property.2
Proof of defectiveness is essential to establishing liability and re-
covering damages in a product liability suit. Proving defectiveness is
often time-consuming, expensive and frequently requires expert testi-
mony.3 The doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel allows a plaintiff to
avoid relitigating the issue of defectiveness if the product at issue has
been found defective in a prior action.4 The rationale is that when a
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of defective-
ness, it would be a waste of time and money to relitigate the identical
issue.5
Advocates of collateral estoppel argue that it promotes judicial
economy and decisional consistency. Liberal application of collateral es-
toppel in product liability, however, has been criticized for putting the
survival of entire industries at risk based on a single, possibly erroneous,
judgment.6 In this article I argue that, regardless of its net economic
benefit, offensive application of collateral estoppel to preclude the issue
of defectiveness in a product liability action constitutes an abridgement
of a fundamental right, namely the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. As such it should be subject to strict scrutiny.
A constitutionally ideal civil jury may disagree on a defendant's
liability, even though all jurors hear the same evidence. The root cause
of divergent opinions among jurors is the constitutional requirement of
juror impartiality. An impartial jury is (i) unbiased, and (ii) representa-
tive of a cross-section of the community where the action is brought.1 In
their refinement of the definition of "bias," the courts have distinguished
between general and specific biases. 8 General biases, such as a low risk
tolerance, are constitutional if they reflect the values of the community.
Specific biases, such as a preconceived opinion of defendant's liability,
are unconstitutional. A representative jury will therefore contain jurors
with, for instance, a diversity of risk attitudes, but no biases specific to
the case.
The diversity of risk attitudes may lead to disagreement on liability.
Relatively risk-tolerant jurors may consider a risk under litigation to be
2 See id.
3 See Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48, 51-53 (2d Cir. 1969) (providing a
classic example of a case dominated by expensive and time-consuming expert testimony on
both sides); see also Kurt Erlenbach, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and Products Liability:
Reasoning with the Unreasonable, 14 ST. MARY's L. J. 19, n.3 (1982).
4 See Erlenbach, supra note 3, at 20.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See discussion infra Part ll.B.
8 See discussion infra Part lI.C-D.
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"reasonable," and find the defendant not liable. Conversely, relatively
risk averse jurors may find that the same evidence supports a verdict of
liability.
The damages verdict rendered by a constitutionally impartial jury in
a case where evidence of liability is separate from damages testimony,
can be written as a.D. The factor a, which varies between zero and one,
represents the jury's degree of disagreement. a = 1 if all jurors agree to
hold defendant liable, while a value of zero corresponds to a unanimous
acquittal. The factor, a, is therefore also indirectly a measure of (i) the
defendant's degree of culpability, (ii) the strength of evidence of liability
and (iii) society's aggregate judgment of the reasonableness of the risk at
issue. The symbol D represents the dollar value of plaintiff's loss, and is
a function only of damages testimony.
If plaintiff successfully invoked offensive collateral estoppel to pre-
clude liability, evidence of liability may be excluded as irrelevant, and
the jury may be instructed to presume liability and render a damages
verdict based only on damages testimony. The jury is now "unanimous"
on liability (by design), and the resulting damages award will be D, in-
stead of a fraction of D.
Bearing in mind that a would be less than one if evidence of liabil-
ity were unconvincing to at least one juror, we argue that offensive appli-
cation of collateral estoppel (forcing a to be equal to one) is an
unconstitutional invasion of a defendant's Seventh Amendment right to a
trial by jury. Offensive collateral estoppel distorts that component of the
jury's damages verdict that reflects society's aggregate judgment of de-
fendant's culpability. Forcing a = 1 results in a damages verdict that
reflects a higher degree of culpability than a constitutionally impartial
jury's "true" judgment, based on (i) the evidence presented at trial, and
(ii) society's standards of risk and safety.
A law or measure that burdens a fundamental right, such as the right
to a jury trial, is subject to strict scrutiny.9 Strict scrutiny analysis
weighs the public policy interests of the challenged measure against the
9 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (applying
strict scrutiny to race-based classification scheme used in college admissions decisions); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 163-64 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to law that burdened right
to privacy); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1964) (stating that "where
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications
which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined");
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (stating that "the right to suffrage is a funda-
mental matter" and as such "must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized"); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrrIONA LAW 1454 (2d ed. 1988) ("Legislative and administrative
classifications are to be strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a compelling
governmental justification if they distribute benefits and burdens in a manner inconsistent with
fundamental rights."); Daniel J. Solove, Note: Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L. J. 459, 461 (1996) ("Strict (or 'height-
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fundamental right that it threatens. The public policy interests in collat-
eral estoppel are decisional consistency and judicial economy. I argue
that the causal connection between offensive collateral estoppel and deci-
sional consistency is ambiguous, and that estoppel actually undermines
consistency in precisely those cases where it is most likely to generate a
constitutional conflict. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has
balanced constitutional rights against each other and against other public
policy interests, analysis of constitutional jurisprudence shows that the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial may not be rationed or
compromised for pure economic gain. 10 Offensive use of collateral es-
toppel to preclude defectiveness does therefore not pass the strict scru-
tiny test of constitutionality.
This analysis has several public policy implications. A constitu-
tional limitation on issue preclusion is likely to affect the economics of
product liability litigation and impede full faith and credit recognition
and enforcement of product liability verdicts across state lines. The the-
ory relied on in the analysis also sheds new light on the judicial interpre-
tation of compromise verdicts.
Part I of this article reviews the standards of liability for product
defectiveness. Part II analyzes the properties of a constitutionally ideal
civil jury in product liability litigation. Part III discusses the process by
which the jury negotiates a liability verdict and damages figure. Part IV
discusses the principles of issue preclusion and analyzes the effect of
collateral estoppel on adjudication of liability and damages. Part V
presents a constitutional analysis of issue preclusion in product liability
litigation. Part VI discusses policy implications of the theory presented
in this article.
I. STANDARD OF LIABILITY
The law of product liability recognizes three categories of product
defectiveness. A product may be defective due to a manufacturing defect,
design defect, or because of inadequate instructions or warnings about
risks inherent in the product." The focus of this article is on the latter
two categories, which involve judgments of the reasonableness of risks.
The so-called risk-utility test is emerging as the leading test for de-
sign defectiveness. This test considers whether the riskiness of a product
could have been reduced without an unreasonable increase in cost and
ened') scrutiny is the most rigorous form of judicial review .... The court has applied strict
scrutiny to cases involving.., laws that burden fundamental rights.").
10 See discussion infra Part IHI.
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCrS LiaBirry § 2 (Proposed Final Draft
1997). See generally RIcHARD A. EpsTEmN, MODERN PRODUcrs LlAnILrrY LAW (1980) (set-
ting forth a comprehensive reexamination of the law of products liability).
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sacrifice of utility. Formally stated, a product is defective in design
"when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative de-
sign... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe." 12 The risk-utility test has been adopted as a stan-
dard, not only by the Restatement, but also by courts13 and academic
commentators.'
4
The most appropriate and logical interpretation of the risk-utility
test is as a "micro-balance."' 15 A micro-balance weighs the costs and
benefits of only the proposed alternative design feature, not the entire
product. If, for instance, the issue is whether an outboard motor should
be equipped with a propeller guard, the appropriate micro risk-utility test
would balance the costs and benefits resulting from adding such a guard,
not the costs and benefits of outboard motors as a whole.16
The risk-utility test balances benefits and costs to society as a
whole, including the manufacturer and all consumers foreseeably af-
fected, not just the litigating parties.' 7 Factors that should be balanced
include effects of the alternative (safer) design on production costs, prod-
uct longevity, maintenance, repair and aesthetics. 18
As an illustration of the risk-utility test, consider the case of an au-
tomobile with a fuel tank configuration designed in such a way that a
rear-end collision might cause it to explode. Suppose the estate of a
driver killed in such an accident brings suit, claiming a defective design.
The burden is then on the plaintiff to propose an alternative design that
12 RESTATEMENT (THID) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABImTY § 2 (Proposed Final Draft
1997).
13 See Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994) (advocating the risk-
utility test); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 254-56 (Miss. 1993) (same).
14 See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 882-87 (1998); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper
Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 Tax. L. REv. 1661,
1661-65 (1997).
15 See Owen, supra note 14, at 1676-86; see also W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEoIss:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSiBILITIES FOR RISK 17 (1992) ("In the usual risk policy decision
- for example, determining what safety characteristics to provide in automobiles - the policy
result to be assessed is an incremental risk reduction rather than a shift involving the certainty
of life or death.") [hereinafter FATAL TRADEOFFS].
16 Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (person killed after com-
ing into contact with outboard motor with unguarded propeller blades). This example is from
Owen, supra note 14, at 1664. A micro-balance version of the risk-utility test can be formal-
ized as follows: "A product is defective in design if it was not designed with reasonable safety,
such that the safety benefits from altering the design, as proposed by the plaintiff, were
foreseeably greater than the resulting costs, including any diminished usefulness or diminished
safety." Id. at 1691.
17 See Owen, supra note 14, at 1680 n.61.
18 See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABLrrY § 2 cmt. f (Proposed Final
Draft 1997).
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would have eliminated the accident. 19 Plaintiff might, for instance, al-
lege that defendant manufacturer could have made the design safer by
installing a metal shield to protect the tank against the impact of a colli-
sion. Liability would depend on whether the net increase in safety (net
number of lives saved by switching designs) outweighed the increase in
cost and loss of utility. The manufacturer may defend its design decision
by showing that the net increase in safety would be outweighed by the
increase in cost and/or loss of utility of the alternative design. The shield
might, for instance, make the car heavier and more expensive and intro-
duce other safety problems.
20
The standard for adequacy of warnings and instructions, like the
standard for defective design, is formulated in terms of a reasonableness
test. Formally, a product is defective due to inadequate instructions or
warnings "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions
or warnings... and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders
the product not reasonably safe."1
21
The common law has developed and expanded these principles, yet
the reasonableness principle has persisted. In First National Bank in Al-
bequerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc.,22 for instance, the
court fleshed out the meaning of "adequate warnings" stating that: (i)
"the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger"; (ii) "the
warning must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of harm
that could result from the danger"; and (iii) "the physical aspects of the
warning - conspicuousness, prominence, relative size of print, etc., -
must be adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person. '2
3
Part 11 analyzes the liability decision of the civil jury as the arbiter
of the reasonable person standard.
I1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL JURY
The civil jury assesses liability for product defectiveness by evaluat-
ing the "reasonableness" of the risk at issue. This assessment depends on
the risk attitudes of the jurors, which in turn depend on the jury selection
process and properties of the constitutionally ideal civil jury.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a trial by an impar-
tial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 24
19 See, e.g., M. Grady, Untaken Precautions, J. LEGAL STUD. 139-56 (1989).
20 See Owen, supra note 14, at 1677-78.
21 RESTATEMENT (TImD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrry § 2 (c) (Proposed Final Draft
1997). See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991)
(en banc); Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993) (en bane).
22 537 P.2d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
23 Id. at 691-92 (citations omitted).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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and the Seventh Amendment extends this right to civil litigants.25 The
rules of jury selection and the judicial interpretation of the meaning of




Federal jury selection proceeds as follows.27 First, the court com-
piles a "source list" of potential jurors from the judicial district where the
action is brought.28 The court then selects a "master file," consisting of a
random selection of at least one half of one percent of the source list.
29
The court selects a smaller random sample from the master file and mails
to each person so selected a questionnaire to determine whether they
qualify for jury service or must be exempted.30 The list of qualified ju-
rors is known as the "jury wheel." 31 From this list the court selects,
again at random, a list of prospective jurors to summon to the court-
house, the so-called "jury venire" or "jury panel."'32 The court may elim-
inate potential jurors from the venire for reasons such as personal
hardship. The remaining potential jurors then go through the process of
"voir dire," where the attorneys for both sides can eliminate potential
jurors for cause or peremptorily. 33 During voir dire each side questions
jurors to identify and challenge jurors they would like to strike. Jurors
may be challenged either for cause (if, for instance, a juror is believed to
be partial) or by exercising a peremptory challenge. The number of per-
emptory challenges available to each side is usually limited by statute.34
The purpose of voir dire is to eliminate case-specific biases.35 The indi-
viduals who survive voir dire constitute the so-called "petit jury," i.e., the
jury that enters the jury box to hear the case.
36
25 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... ").
26 The Jury Selection and Service Act ("JSSA") codifies the constitutional right of de-
fendants to a jury selected at random from a fair cross-section of the community where the
court convenes. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
27 This description draws on Hmosm FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
DisENFRANCr~i AND Tm SARCH FOR JusTicE 42-78 (1993).
28 See id. at 44-47.
29 See id at 47-51.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 51-56.
32 See id at 56-58.
33 See id. at 68-71.
34 The fair cross-section requirement applies to the selection procedure up to and includ-
ing the venire, but does not govern voir dire. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64
(1979) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
35 See FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 26, at 68-71.
36 See id at 71-78.
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B. IMPARTALITY
The only property of the jury explicitly articulated in the Constitu-
tion is that of impartiality, stipulated in the Sixth Amendment. It is not
explicitly mentioned in the Seventh Amendment, but the Supreme Court
has held that the impartiality requirement applies to civil as well as crim-
inal juries.
37
The Supreme Court has interpreted an impartial jury as one that is
(i) drawn from a representative cross-section of the community,38 and (ii)
unbiased.39 This dual interpretation may seem inherently contradictory.
If, for instance, most people in a society have a low risk tolerance, the
cross-sectional requirement would mandate that they be proportionally
represented on the jury. The inclusion of a majority of individuals with a
low risk-tolerance may, however, be seen as creating a pro-plaintiff bias
in a product liability action, apparently negating the impartiality require-
ment. The analysis presented in this section shows that the courts have
resolved this potential conflict by refining the legal definition of "bias."
C. CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
Product liability adjudication is based on a hybrid mixture of objec-
tive, case-specific facts, such as medical expenditures and proven eco-
nomic damages, as well as subjective values, such as the value of a
marginal increase in safety or the reasonableness of a risk. A core value
of the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury is that questions of fact
should be adjudicated in accordance with the norms and values of the
community where the court convenes. 40 The Supreme Court has formal-
37 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("The American tradition of trial
by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily con-
templates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community."); see also McDon-
ough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984); Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975).
38 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
39 Dennis v. U.S., 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Frasier v. U.S., 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
40 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("We accept the fair-cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment .... "); Thiel,
328 U.S. at 220 (Inherent in the American tradition of trial by jury is "an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community."); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)
("It is part of the established tradition ... of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community."); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The
jury is supposed to provide the common sense judgment of the community. The Duncan
Court's reasoning suggests that when a jury's decision differs from that of the judge, it is
usually because they are serving this very purpose. See id. at 156-57. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1140, 1187 (1991) (stating
that juries do not make the law, but adapt it to the values of their community); James J. Gobert,
In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CPIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 279-80 (1988) ("[A]
person's political, moral, social, and economic views.., are viewed as indispensable qualities
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ized this requirement by interpreting an impartial jury as one drawn from
a representative cross-section of the community.4
1
The cross-section requirement is a theoretical ideal that an individ-
ual twelve member jury cannot achieve. Hence, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the Constitution does not guarantee a petit jury42 or even a
jury panel43 that perfectly mirrors a community which theoretically per-
mits infinitely many groups and classifications. 44 The Supreme court, as
a practical matter, limited cross-section protection to so-called "cogniza-
ble groups,"45 specifying the (petit) jury be selected from a venire from
which no so-called "cognizable group" has been systematically
excluded.
4 6
Courts have defined a cognizable group as one with (i) a common
defining and limiting attribute, (ii) a distinctive attitude or experience,
and (iii) a "community of interest," the exclusion of which would render
the jury pool unrepresentative of the community. 47 The courts generally
agree, for instance, that women and African Americans constitute dis-
tinctive groups. Further, when jury officials intentionally discriminate
against a group, that group effectively becomes a cognizable group.48
D. ABSENCE OF BIAs
An impartial jury must not only be diverse, but also unbiased. The
Supreme Court has defined an unbiased jury as one where each juror is, a
of the ideal juror' and jurors should be allowed to make value (as opposed to factual) judg-
ments without restriction).
41 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953).
42 The "petit jury" is the actual jury for the civil trial. See BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY
(6' ed. 1990).
43 The Jury panel is the group of prospective jurors from which the petit jury is chosen.
See BLACK'S LAW DicnONARY (6' ed. 1990).
44 See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
45 U.S. v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Because discrimination in the
venire under the Sixth Amendment may be statistical, the definition of a single 'cognizable'
group must be narrowly drawn lest any group imaginable by defense counsel be found numeri-
cally underrepresented."); see also Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1' Cir. 1995) (en
banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 (1986).
46 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528-30 (1975) (impartiality requires the jury venire
to be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (stating that the cross-section requirement guarantees "a fair possibility for
obtaining a representative cross-section of the community").
47 See, e.g,. U.S. v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
48 See Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 1000 (1St Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050
(1986).
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priori, indifferent to the outcome of the case 49 and "conscientiously
appl[ies] the law and find[s] the facts."50
The Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation of impartiality
identifies two types of bias, namely specific and general bias. Specific
bias is particular to the case at hand, such as that exhibited by a juror
with a preconceived opinion of the outcome of the case, perhaps due to
exposure to pre-trial publicity.51 Procedural mechanisms to eliminate
this kind of bias include the peremptory and for cause challenges, voir
dire, sequestration of the jury, and change of venue.52 The purpose of
the challenges is to remove jurors who have a specific bias, but no other
biases.5
3
General biases are community values, such as risk attitudes and the
valuation of life and health. Jurors with a mix of general biases will be
impartial if the mix reflects the distribution of general biases of the com-
munity.54 Hence, this type of bias does not violate the Seventh Amend-
ment, but is essential to satisfy the fair cross-section requirement. A
juror with a low risk tolerance may be said to have a general bias in
favor of a product liability plaintiff. Such a juror is nevertheless unbi-
49 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 716 (1992); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
225 n.l (1982); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551 (1976); Ristaino v. Ross
424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976); Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080, 1081 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (finding juror with preconceived opin-
ion on outcome of trial cannot be impartial); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-6
(1936); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); CorE ON LrrrLEON 155b (19th
ed. 1832) (An impartial juror is one who is "indifferent as he stands unsworn," (quoted in
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722)).
50 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 179 (1986) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 423 (1985); see also Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892) ("A juror who has
conscientious scruples on any subject, which prevent him from standing indifferent between
the government and the accused, and from trying the case according to the law and the evi-
dence, is not an impartial juror."); U.S. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692G) (An impartial jury is one that will "fairly hear the testimony which may be offered to
them, and bring in their verdict according to that testimony, and according to the law arising
on it."). Justice Marshall describes the required mental state for impartiality: 'The jury should
enter upon the trial with minds open to those impressions which the testimony and the law of
the case ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions which will resist those impres-
sions." Id.
51 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (finding pre-trial publicity denied
petitioner a fair trial); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978) (A specific bias is one
"relating to the particular case on trial or the parties or witnesses thereto. .. ").
52 See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53
MD. L. Rnv. 107, 121 (1994).
53 See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) ("Peremptory challenges, by
enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side,
are a means of 'eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides', thereby 'assuring the selec-
tion of a qualified and unbiased jury.'") (citations omitted).
54 See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978) (The purpose of the cross-
section doctrine is to "achieve an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the diverse
beliefs and values the jurors bring from their group experiences.").
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ased in the Constitutional sense if she is ex ante indifferent to the out-
come of the case, and applies the law and finds the facts based on
evidence presented at trial.
In summary, the constitutionally ideal impartial civil jury represents
the distribution of values (general biases) of a cross-section of the com-
munity, including a diversity of risk attitudes, but is free of specific bi-
ases. This standard has been characterized as a "diffused impartiality.
'55
III. LIABILITY AND DAMAGES: THE MIRACLE OF
'VICARIOUS SETTLEMENT'
A jury with a representative diversity of risk attitudes, wealth, age
and educational groups, may disagree on the reasonableness of a risk,
instruction or warning. As a result, the jury may split on the issue of
liability. Part II of this article analyzes the mechanism by which a non-
unanimous jury reconciles its disagreement in order to reach a verdict.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL JURY AND LIA~mITY
Liability depends on a judgment of the reasonableness of a risk,
which in turn depends on the risk attitudes of the person making the
judgment. Risk attitudes vary significantly across individuals due to in-
dividual differences in factors such as risk tolerance, wealth, and age.
56
Some individuals select riskier professions, choose to smoke, and do not
use automobile seatbelts. These relatively risk tolerant individuals can
be expected to value life and health less than risk averse individuals.
57
This is confirmed by empirical studies that are relevant to our interest in
the effect of risk attitudes on liability assessment.58 Empirical studies
based on labor market data, for instance, measure the wage premium
workers require to enter a risky profession. 59 The compensation pre-
mium per incremental statistical death, defined as the worker's value of
life, reflects the worker's valuation of an incremental increase in
probability of death or injury. This valuation is analogous to the valua-
tion a civil juror makes in a product liability decision.
60
55 Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881
(1979). Diversity of opinion among jurors is the court's idea of "diffused impartiality." Id. at
515; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
56 See Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 15, at 34-41. "Risk-dollar tradeoffs reflect
individual preferences that will differ across individuals, just as do tastes and preferences for
other economic goods .... [W]e should be concerned with ascertaining the distribution of
values that are pertinent to the preferences of the individuals whose lives are at risk." Id. at 7.
57 See id. at 8.
58 See id. at 51-74.
59 See id. at 34-49.
60 See id. at 8. Liability for product defectiveness depends on whether the risks of a
product could have been reduced without an unreasonable increase in cost and sacrifice of
utility. This requires an implicit valuation of a statistical life or injury. See id. at 10.
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Empirical evidence indicates that individuals in riskier professions,
individuals who smoke and individuals who do not wear automobile
seatbelts tend to place a lower dollar value on life and health in compari-
son to those in safer professions, non-smokers and seatbelt users.61 Val-
uation of life and health also appears to increase with income and
decrease with age.62 Young people may demand a greater safety level as
they have a greater expected span of life. Therefore, products that ex-
pose children to risk will be held to a higher standard than products used
by the general public.
63
Evaluation of the adequacy of a warning or instruction involves a
value judgment that, as in the case of a design decision, depends on fac-
tors such as the risk tolerance, wealth, age, and education of the deci-
sionmaker. Better educated people may demand and are able to
efficiently process more detailed warnings and instructions. Less-edu-
cated people may prefer simple instructions and warnings. Products that
are likely to be used by or near children may be required to display warn-
ings that are particularly obvious and clear. Some situations require a
great deal of detail and full disclosure, while in others too much detail
may distract from the essence of the instructions or warnings, rendering
them ineffective.
There is also an implicit risk-utility tradeoff, between the utility of a
particular level of warning and direct and indirect costs. Direct costs in-
clude the cost of a warning label, while indirect costs include information
overload - "too much" warning and instruction - and other sources of
utility loss resulting from excessive warning and instruction.
64
61 See id. at 47, tbl. 3-6. Viscusi reports empirical evidence on the heterogeneity in value
of life over risk level of occupations. For instance, workers in the lowest quartile of risk level
implicitly value a statistical life at between $5 and 8 million (depending on the estimation
method, compared to a valuation of between $ 2.8 and 3 million for the highest risk quartile).
See id.; see also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differ-
ences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 J. Hum. RESoURcES 202 (1990). Hersch and Viscusi report
a lower risk-dollar tradeoff (lower valuation of life and health) among smokers and non-
seatbelt users. In their study, workers receive an average premium of $56,500 per statistical
injury (1990 dollars), while the group of workers who are nonsmokers and seatbelt users re-
quire a premium of $95,220 per statistical injury. The group including only smokers require a
premium of only $30,781. See id. at 202-227.
62 Luxury cars such as Mercedes Benz and Acura offer air bags and antilock braking
systems, while lower-priced vehicles generally avoid these features. See Viscusi, FATAL
TRADEOFFS, supra note 15, at 28-29. "Because of the positive income elasticity of the demand
for good health, the more affluent workers will have safer jobs." Id. at 55; see also W. Kip
Viscusi, & William N. Evans, Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and
Economic Implications, 80 AM. EcON. REv. 353-372 (1990) (reporting, for instance, that risk
valuations have an income elasticity of approximately 1.0).
63 See Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 15, at 30 (citing Richard J. Zeckhauser &
Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 LAW & CoNrTrP. PRoas., Autumn 1976,
at 5).
64 See DAVID G. OwEN ET AL., PRODucTs LIABmirn AN SAFETY 329-30 (3d ed. 1996).
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A constitutionally ideal jury represents a cross-section of the com-
munity where the action is brought, including a cross-section of risk atti-
tudes, age groups and wealth and educational levels. Such a jury can
therefore be expected to be non-unanimous on the issue of liability, espe-
cially where the evidence is ambiguous. Empirical research on jury deci-
sionmaking and information from reported case decisions show that an
initially non-unanimous jury often reaches consensus on liability through
a mechanism known as "vicarious settlement."
B. VICARIOUS SETLMENT
It is the task of the jury to hear and weigh the evidence and decide
the liability of the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. If it
finds the defendant liable, regardless of the margin of her fault, a plaintiff
receives compensation for all proven damages. Conversely, if defendant
is found not liable, no damages are awarded. The damage award should
not vary with the degree of fault of the defendant. 65 A non-unanimous
jury would therefore consist of jurors who want to hold defendant liable
and award the full amount of proven damages, and those who want to
acquit and award zero damages. The two groups face considerable pres-
sure to either negotiate a compromise or otherwise face an unacceptable
alternative, namely a hung jury.66 Empirical research and reported case
decisions suggest that they often reach agreement by effectively disre-
garding the legal principle that the damage award may not be improperly
compromised. 67 The result is a negotiated compromise, namely an
agreement to reduce the damages award in exchange for an agreement to
impose liability. This negotiated compromise, aptly termed "vicarious
settlement," reflects the aggregate judgment of the jury, instead of exclu-
65 See 8 AM. JuR. Pleading & Practice Forms § 179 (1996) ("In arriving at your verdict
you must not make a compromise between the question of liability and the amount of dam-
ages, if any."); see also Simmons v. Fish, 97 N.E. 102 (Mass. 1912) (ordering a new trial
because verdict was held to be based on improper compromise between liability and damages);
CHARLES T. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1935). In deliberations on
the damages award, jurors should not compromise on "vital points" such as liability. Individ-
ual concessions on the damages award are acceptable and recognized in the common law, as
long as it is not the result of abandonment by one juror subgroup of their conviction on liabil-
ity in exchange for concessions on damages by another group. Id. at 62, 64. Degree of culpa-
bility does, of course, play a role in punitive damages and in cases where comparative and
contributory negligence play a role, which we do not consider here. See, e.g., Simmons, 97
N.E. at 106.
66 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
Omo ST. L.J. 158, 177 (1958) ("This is the result of many pressures including a great reluc-
tance to fail to do their job and have the jury hung.").
67 See, e.g., MCMOR MCK supra note 65, at 64-65 (In deliberations on the damages
award, jurors should not compromise on "vital issues" such as liability. Individual conces-
sions on the damages award are acceptable and recognized in the common law, as long as it is
not the result of abandonment by one juror subgroup of their conviction on liability in ex-
change for concessions on damages by another group.).
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sively one subgroup.68 We now turn to a formal quantitative analysis of
the process of vicarious settlement.
The non-unanimous jury is under pressure to negotiate a compro-
mise or face the unacceptable alternative of a hung jury. As a practical
matter, the negotiated compromise is the usual outcome: The jury
reaches an agreement that reduces the damages award in exchange for
agreement regarding liability. This negotiated compromise, aptly termed
"vicarious settlement," reflects the aggregate judgment of the jury, rather
than the exclusive judgment of one faction or the other.
69
The following model illustrates the process of vicarious settlement.
Evidence of liability is assumed to be separate from damages testimony,
as is true in many tort cases.70 Liability may, for instance, depend on
technical aspects of a design decision, while damages may depend on the
dollar value of lost earnings and medical expenses.
Each juror forms an estimate of the plaintiff's loss, based on dam-
ages testimony, and makes a decision on the defendant's liability, based
on evidence relevant to liability. We denote the i-th juror's estimate of
plaintiff s loss by Di, and the outcome of the juror's liability decision by
Li. A value of Li = 0 denotes a finding of no liability, and Li = 1 a
finding of liability. Since evidence on liability and damages are separate
and Di depends only on the latter, Di is the same amount, whether the i-th
juror hears evidence on liability or not. If a juror decides to hold defend-
ant not liable, she will want to award zero damages, regardless of the
value of Di. The damages verdict with which each juror comes to the
68 See Kalven supra note 66, at 177-78 ("[TMhe function of the jury in the end may be not
to adjudicate the case, but ... to settle it vicariously .... The damage verdict therefore is
especially likely to reflect the composite view of the jury as a group and not to be the product
of the single strong juror or the strong faction.").
In jurisdictions that require only a majority jury verdict, compromises such as these are
likely only in close cases where equal numbers of jurors favor liability and acquittal. See E.
Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 225, 240 (1989).
69 See Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking,
52 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoas., Autumn 1989, at 225. In jurisdictions that require only a major-
ity jury verdict, compromises such these are likely only in close cases where equal numbers of
jurors favor liability and acquittal. Id. at 240; see also Kalven supra note 66, at 177-78
("[T]he function of the jury in the end may be not to adjudicate the case, but.., to settle it
vicariously .... The damage verdict therefore is especially likely to reflect the composite view
of the jury as a group and not to be the product of the single strong juror or the strong
faction.").
70 See Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.
REv. 779, 829 n.279 (1985) (citing Hosie v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 282 F.2d 639 (7" Cir.
1960)). Hosie provides an exception where the nature of a plaintiff's injuries had a bearing on
liability. Liability depended on the cause of a flame that triggered an explosion. Damages
testimony, which included evidence such as the location and nature of bums on plaintiff's
body, was found relevant to a determination of the origin of the flame. See id. at 642-43.
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table can therefore be written as Li'D, which equals zero or Di, depending
on the juror's liability finding.
The adjudication of a case may proceed according to one of two
scenarios, depending on whether or not liability is precluded. In the first,
the issue of liability is precluded and evidence of liability is therefore
excluded as irrelevant. The jurors are instructed to assume that defend-
ant is liable, and to render a damage verdict based on relevant testimony.
Hence Li = 1 for all jurors, and each comes to the table with a non-zero
damages figure in mind, namely D, i = 1, 2, ... , 12. The jury negotiates
and renders a damages verdict, denoted D.
In the second scenario, jurors hear evidence of both liability and
damages. If the evidence is not entirely convincing to all jurors, they
may disagree on liability. Now, for some jurors, Li = 0, and their Li*D
figure becomes zero, while the remainder of the jurors come to the table
with the same damages figure in mind as in the first scenario, namely Di.
It is reasonable to assume that the damages verdict the two factions nego-
tiate in this scenario will be lower than in scenario one. In scenario one,
all jurors come to the negotiating table with a non-zero damages figure,
Di > 0. In scenario two, this figure is the same for some jurors, but zero
for those who hold Li = 0.7 1 We denote the reduced damages verdict by
a*D, a < 1.
Research on jury decisionmaking indeed suggests that jurors recon-
cile their conflicting opinions on liability by negotiating a compromise
damages verdict. Jurors who want to hold the defendant liable (Li = 1)
accommodate those who do not (Li = 0) by agreeing on a reduced dam-
ages verdict in exchange for a liability verdict. The reduced damages
verdict can be written as a.D, a < 1.
As a simple illustrative example of the effect of liability preclusion,
consider a case where the plaintiff's loss is an uncontroversial and
proven amount, equal to D. The jury is evenly split on liability, i.e., six
members of a twelve person jury want to award zero damages, while six
want to award the full amount of D. Suppose that, as is often the case
empirically,7 2 the jury compromises by averaging their individual awards
to reach a damages verdict. The resulting damage award will be equal to
71 Suppose the jury's damages verdict could be written as a weighted average of the
damages estimates of the individual jurors, with the weights denoted by ai: D = 3 aiL*Di. In
scenario one, each Li = 1, Di > 0, and Damages = D. In scenario two, Li = 0 for some i, and
hence the summation will be less than D, written as aoD, a< 1.
For a mathematical derivation of the jury's damage award as a weighted average of indi-
vidual jurors' damage estimates, see M. de Villiers, A Legal and Policy Analysis of Bifjrcated
Litigation, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (2000).
72 See JEROME FRAN, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALrrY N AMERicAN JUSTICE
114 (1949) ("Again and again, it has been disclosed that... [e]ach juror... writes down the
amount he wants to award, the total is added and the average is taken as the verdict."); see also
JOHN GUINTMER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 97 (1988) (citing an empirical study reporting that in
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0.5.D, i.e., a = 0.5. If the jury were unanimous on liability, or if liability
were precluded, there would be no compromise and the damage award
would equal the full amount, D.
The discount factor, a reflects the jury's aggregate assessment of'
the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Since the jury repre-
sents a cross-section of their community, a also represents societal norms
and values of risk and safety, such as risk-dollar tradeoff and valuation of
life and health. Although the law does not recognize degrees of liability
for product defectiveness, the constitutionally impartial jury effectively
creates such a continuum to reconcile conflicting values in the commu-
nity it represents.
7 3
Empirical studies support the theory of vicarious settlement. Based
on post-trial jury interviews, Guinther postulates that jury deliberations
may proceed according to three possible scenarios.74 In the first scena-
rio, all jurors agree on the defendant's liability and proceed to negotiate a
damage award based on the evidence presented at trial. They may disa-
gree on the size of the damages award, but each juror goes into the delib-
erations with a (non-zero) figure in mind. In the second scenario, a
majority of the jurors want to hold the defendant liable, while a minority
want to acquit. In the third scenario, there is also disagreement on liabil-
ity, but here a minority favors holding the defendant liable, while a ma-
jority wants to acquit. In the second and third scenarios, the damages
award becomes the bargaining mechanism through which the disagreeing
groups settle their differences. In both cases they may settle on a verdict
for the plaintiff, but with a reduced damage award to placate the group
that favored the defendant. The result is a discounted damage award,
relative to the "full" award of the first scenario.7 5
40% of cases where jurors greatly disagreed on the damages award, they simply averaged
individual suggestions to reach an agreement).
73 See Kalven, supra note 66:
If we imagine for a moment a series of cases in which the facts as to damages remain
identical but the facts as to liability range over the full and rich possibilities of negligence, the
legal view is that the award should be constant throughout the series. The jury's view is that
these may be significantly different cases.
Id. at 165-66; see also Stephen R. Mysliwiec, Note, Toward Principles of Jury Equity, 83
YALE LI. 1023, 1045 (1974) (stating that social psychological research indicates that a jury, if
given the discretion, will return a harsher verdict against a defendant the more significant the
evidence of wrongdoing).
74 GUINTHER, supra note 72, at 96.
75 See id. at 86. Guinther reports that in a majority of cases in his study where the
verdict was for the plaintiff and where a unanimous verdict was required, there is evidence of a
compromise on the damages award between the jury faction who favored liability and the
faction who did not. In jurisdictions that did not require a unanimous verdict (e.g. jurisdictions
that required that five out of six jurors must agree), such compromises occurred less frequently
(in about one third of such cases). See id.
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Professor Dale Broeder reports evidence from experimental juries
showing that the damage award tends to vary proportionally to juror per-
ceptions of liability, i.e., damage awards depend on the strength of the
evidence against the defendant. 76 In Broeder's experiments, juries were
presented with two different versions of the same case. In one version
the defendant's liability was clear, while in the other it was doubtful.
The average damages award for the case where liability was clear was
$41,000. For the doubtful case the average award was $34,000. Broeder
suggests that these results are consistent with long-held suspicion among
trial lawyers that the weaker the proof of liability, the lower the damage
award is likely to be.
77
Professors Phares and Wilson78 report similar results from a study
where a simulated jury was presented with summaries of actual civil
cases. Severity of outcomes, as well as strength of evidence of liability
against the defendant varied. Within each category of severity of out-
come, the damage award varied proportionally to the strength of evi-
dence of liability. Landsman et al., similarly, found that compensatory
damage awards varied according to strength of evidence of liability in
unitary trials, but not in bifurcated trials.
79
The observed link between strength of evidence and the size of the
damage award is consistent with the theory of vicarious settlement. As
the evidentiary strength of liability increases, the number of jurors who
are swayed to impose liability on the defendant will also increase. As the
number of jurors for whom Li = 1 increases, the expression for the group
damage award 3aiLioDi, increases, resulting in a higher compromise dam-
age award. Hence, a positive correlation between evidentiary strength
and the size of damage award, as observed by Broeder and Phares and
Wilson.
These observations are formalized in a set of principles of jury eq-
uity compiled by Stephen R. Mysliwiec,80 based on social psychological
research. One principle states, for instance, that "[t]he greater the ambi-
76 Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB L. REv. 744, 753-
54 (1959).
77 See id.; see also Kalven supra note 66, at 165-66 ("It we imagine for a moment a
series of cases in which the facts as to damages remain identical but the facts as to liability
range over the full and rich possibilities of negligence the legal view is that the award should
be constant throughout the series. The jury's view is that these may be significantly different
cases."); Greene supra note 69, at 233 n.51.
78 Phares & Wilson Responsibility Attribution: Role of Outcome Severity, Situational
Ambiguity, and Internal-External Control, 40 J. PERs. 392 (1972).
79 Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effect of
Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 297 (1998).
80 See Mysliwiec supra note 73.
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guity surrounding the defendant's civil liability or criminal guilt, the
milder the damages or punishment will be."
'81
There is evidence of compromise damage awards in reported case
decisions, and some courts have explicitly acknowledged the necessity of
compromise in order to reach a verdict. The decision in Bickler v. Eli
Lilly,82 for instance, a product liability action involving the drug diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES), was apparently based on a compromise verdict.83 One
of the jurors interviewed allegedly admitted that she did not want to hold
defendant liable but agreed to a verdict of liability on condition that the
damages award be reduced.
84
In the United States' legal system, the jury generally has the right to
determine liability and damages without having to reveal or explain the
process by which it reached its decision. This effectively gives the jury
the power to resolve a case equitably where strict application of the law
would reach a result contrary to its notion of fairness. Supreme Court
decisions have acknowledged that deviance from a general legal rule
often reflects the demands of equity, rather than jury bias or
incompetence. 85
In summary, a negotiated compromise damage verdict is the direct
result of the constitutional requirement that a verdict on an issue of fact
81 Id. at 1045.
82 No. 15600/74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Co., July 1979, discussed in Katz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 84 F.R.D. 378, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
83 See Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378, 379 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (discussing Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), and the commentary from that case
regarding a compromise verdict).
84 See Katz, 84 F.R.D. at 380; see also Taylor v. Hawkinson, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (Cal.
1957) (acknowledging the effectiveness of a compromise verdict in achieving finality in an
action and citing generally Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 475 (1886)); Moore v. Schnei-
der, 196 Cal. 380, 389 (1925); Fitzgerald v. Terminal Dev. Co., 53 P.2d 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1936)).
85 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("[T]he essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the common-sense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility
that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156-58 (1968); see also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (confirming that the judicial role is limited to declaring the applicable law).
The courts acknowledge that the very purpose of the civil jury is to adjudicate matters on
which reasonable people may disagree. If facts are so clear that only one conclusion is possi-
ble, there would be no need for a jury and the issue could be resolved by a judge. See Applica-
tion of Eynde, 480 F.2d 1364, 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("[F]acts constituting the state of the art
[in a patent case] are normally subject to the possibility of rational disagreement among rea-
sonable men and are not amenable to the taking of such [judicial or administrative] notice.");
Barr v. Curry, 71 S.E.2d 313, 317 (W. Va. 1952) (concluding that when evidence of negli-
gence is such that reasonable people may draw different conclusions from it, the issue should
be decided by a jury; when the facts point unambiguously to one conclusion, it becomes a
question of law for the court).
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reflect (i) the values of a cross-section of the community, and (ii) an
unbiased decision, based on all relevant evidence presented at trial.
When a product has been determined to be defective, the issue may
be precluded in a subsequent action through a procedural doctrine known
as collateral estoppel. When estoppel has been successfully invoked, lia-
bility is not relitigated and evidence of liability may be excluded if it is
independent of and separate from evidence of damages. There will con-
sequently be no room for juror disagreement on liability. In the notation
of the model of vicarious settlement, the jury will render a damage award
equal to D, instead of the (possibly smaller) amount, aoD, that they
would render based on all evidence.
Part IV reviews the principles of issue preclusion, and Part V ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of this distortion of the damages award
through offensive application of collateral estoppel.
IV. ISSUE PRECLUSION
Liability and damages are the principal issues in a product liability
suit. Liability depends on a finding of defectiveness and causation.
8 6
Once a product has been found defective, a party in a subsequent action
involving the same product and defect may want to rely on this judgment
without having to relitigate the issue. A plaintiff usually has a strong
incentive to obtain summary judgment on a previously litigated issue,
such as design defectiveness. Proving defectiveness is often expensive
and time-consuming. 87 Well-developed judicial rules exist that allow is-
sue preclusion.
A family of doctrines, known as res judicata, governs the binding
effect of a judgment on subsequent proceedings. Three distinct members
of the family are merger, bar and collateral estoppel. The doctrine of
merger prevents relitigation of a claim decided in favor of a plaintiff in a
prior action, by "merging" the original cause of action with the judg-
ment.88 The doctrine of bar prevents an unsuccessful plaintiff from relit-
86 In this article we assume that causation is incontrovertible, so that defectiveness and
liability are synonymous.
87 See Erlenbach, supra note 3.
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. a (1982):
When the plaintiff recovers a valid and final personal judgment, his original claim is
extinguished and rights upon the judgment are substituted for it. The plaintiffs origi-
nal claim is said to be "merged" in the judgment. It is immaterial whether the de-
fendant had a defense to the original action if he did not rely on it, or if he did rely
on it and judgment was nevertheless given against him. It is immaterial whether the
judgment was rendered upon a verdict or upon a motion to dismiss or other objection
to the pleadings or upon consent, confession, or default.
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igating the same cause of action a second time.89 Suppose, for example,
a plaintiff sues unsuccessfully to recover for an injury to his arm in an
accident. The adverse judgment bars this plaintiff from suing again on
the same cause of action. He cannot, for instance, sue again to recover
for head injuries allegedly sustained in the same accident. Now suppose
the plaintiff prevailed in the first suit and recovered damages. The origi-
nal judgment will nevertheless preclude any further suits. The successful
plaintiff cannot, for instance, sue to recover for a different injury sus-
tained in the same accident, because the second claim is considered
merged into the first.90 Merger and bar prevent relitigation of claims.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of an issue or
fact that has been finally adjudicated on the merits by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction. Collateral estoppel is therefore also known as "issue
preclusion."91
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of
an issue in a subsequent and different cause of action provided that (i) the
issue was determined on its merits in a prior final adjudication before a
court of competent jurisdiction, (ii) the parties against whom estoppel is
applied had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action, (iii) the identical issue was actually litigated and decided in the
former action, and (iv) decision of the identical issue was necessary for
the determination of that action. 92 Application of collateral estoppel re-
quires not only identity between the issue to be precluded and that de-
cided in the prior action (e.g., product defectiveness), but also requires
that the definition of defectiveness applied in the prior case be consistent
with the standard followed in the jurisdiction where application of estop-
pel is sought.93 To discourage a wait-and-see attitude among potential
plaintiffs, courts are reluctant to apply offensive collateral estoppel in
cases where plaintiff could easily have joined in the first action, or where
such application would be unfair to a defendant.
94
89 See id. at § 19 ("[A] valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defend-
ant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim.").
90 See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 607 (1985).
91 See, e.g., Eason v. Weaver, 557 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977); Zdanok v. Glid-
den Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1964); Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261,268-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Washington v. United States, 366 A.2d 457, 460 (D.C. 1976).
92 See e.g., FRimEraiAL ET AL. supra note 90, at § 14.11 (1985).
93 For a discussion of the identity of issue requirement in product liability, see
Erlenbach, supra note 3, at 26-29.
94 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31. "Unfair' application of
offensive collateral estoppel includes situations where: (i) the defendant had no incentive to
expend substantial resources in litigating the first action, either because he could not reason-
ably foresee the extent of future litigation on the same issue or because of the small stakes
involved in the original action; (ii) prior actions on the same issue were decided inconsistently,
especially if most were decided in favor of defendant; and (iii) a different result could reason-
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Skrzat v. Ford Motor Co.95 presents an example of the application
of offensive collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of design defec-
tiveness. In an accident involving a Ford Maverick, a gas tank exploded,
killing one passenger (Turcotte) and burning the other (Skrzat). In a suit
on behalf of Turcotte's estate, it was determined that the gas tank was
defectively designed and the manufacturer was held liable for Turcotte's
death. Skrzat then sued independently and was granted summary judg-
ment on the liability issue based on the Turcotte judgment.
96
Collateral estoppel may also be used defensively. A party who won
on an issue in an action may use collateral estoppel defensively in a sec-
ond suit to preclude relitigation of the same issue by the same plaintiff.
97
Due process concerns require that only a party to an action or their
privies can later be bound by the judgment in the action.98 This privity
requirement prevents a defendant who prevailed in an action to collater-
ally estop a non-party plaintiff. Suppose, for instance, a victim of an
automobile accident sues the manufacturer of the automobile alleging a
defectively designed gasoline tank. The manufacturer then prevails on
the defectiveness issue. This judgment does not preclude a different
plaintiff from relitigating the identical issue in a different cause of action.
Collateral estoppel may be used offensively, however, by a non-privy
plaintiff in a subsequent suit. If, in the automobile example, the decision
had gone against the defendant, a subsequent non-privy plaintiff could
have used collateral estoppel offensively to estop defendant from deny-
ing defectiveness.
Traditionally, courts adhered to the mutuality requirement in apply-
ing the rules of collateral estoppel. Mutuality of estoppel limits the use
of issue preclusion to parties who were bound by the original judgment.
Under mutuality a plaintiff cannot apply collateral estoppel offensively
unless it could have been used defensively against her, had the original
case been decided in favor of the defendant. While this doctrine was in
force, it meant that only the original plaintiff or her privy could rely on a
ably be expected in the second suit, e.g., due to procedural differences. See id.; see also
Erlenbach, supra note 3, at 30-31.
95 389 F. Supp. 753 (D.R.I. 1975), cited in Erlenbach, supra note 3, at 36 n.102.
96 See id. For a case where offensive collateral estoppel was applied to defectiveness
because of inadequate warnings, see Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir.
1979).
97 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4; Blonder-Tongue Lab, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971); see also FREDENTHAL supra note 90, at § 14.9; Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting
History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur,
76 CoRNELL L. REv. 589, 614-17 (1991).
98 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320-21
(1971) (citing Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 644 (1936)).
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prior judgment to preclude litigation of an issue.99 The mutuality re-
quirement was overruled by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore. °00 Courts eventually abolished mutuality in most states,101
which led to expanded application of collateral estoppel.
If the issue of liability were precluded by application of offensive
collateral estoppel, the jury will be instructed to assess damages on the
presumption that the defendant is liable. In cases where evidence of lia-
bility is separate from damages testimony, either party can, through a
motion in limine,x02 move to exclude evidence on liability as irrelevant
or prejudicial. This removes all potential for disagreement on liability
among jurors, so that, in the usual notation, the jury can be expected to
render a damages award of D, instead of aoD, where, generally, a < 1.
Part V analyzes the constitutionality of this invasion of the jury's
adjudication of the size of the damage award.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A "fundamental right" in constitutional jurisprudence is any right
which, explicitly or implicitly, derives from the United States Constitu-
tion,103 including the right to a jury trial. 104 A law that burdens a funda-
mental right violates equal protection or due process unless found to pass
the "strict scrutiny" test.'0 5 Under a strict scrutiny standard, the burden
shifts to the state to show that it has a compelling interest in the chal-
lenged measure and that the causal connection between the means and
the end is extremely close.10 6
99 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. Il1,
117-18 (1912); Foltz v. Pullman, Inc., 319 A.2d 38, 41 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), cited in
Erlenbach, supra note 3, at 29 n.58; FRmDENTHAL supra note 90, at § 14.14.
100 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979).
101 The California Supreme Court discarded mutuality by a unanimous decision in Bern.
hard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
102 A motion in limine is a pre-trial motion made by a party to exclude prejudicial evi-
dence from trial. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (6" ed. 1990).
103 See BLAcK's LAw DICrIoNARY 674 (6th ed. 1990).
104 The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial in civil cases is so important and fundamental that any seeming erosion of that
right should be rigorously scrutinized. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500, 501 (1959) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)); Jacob v. New York
City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) ("The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a
basic and fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the
Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen... should be jealously
guarded by the courts.").
105 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (subject-
ing race-based classification scheme in medical school admission process to strict scrutiny
under Equal Protection clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (subjecting challenge to
anti-abortion statute to strict scrutiny under Due Process Clause); see also Tribe supra note 9,
at § 16-6.
106 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
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The Supreme Court has extended strict scrutiny to common law
rules, such as rules of tort liability, which include the common law rules
that govern collateral estoppel. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,10 7 for
instance, the Court subjected common law privacy rules to First Amend-
ment scrutiny, stating that:
[a]lthough this is a civil lawsuit between private par-
ties .... [i]t matters not that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though sup-
plemented by statute. The test is not the form in which
state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.'
08
Issue preclusion in cases where evidence of liability and damages
are separate creates two classes of defendants. The first class consists of
defendants against whom evidence of liability clearly exceeds the rea-
sonableness threshold of the community. These defendants will elicit a
unanimous verdict of liability. The second class consists of defendants
who are likely to elicit a split liability verdict, or acquittal. In this case,
relatively risk tolerant jurors may view the risk under litigation as rea-
sonable and want to acquit the defendant, while more risk averse jurors
may want to vote for liability, based on the same evidence. Although
this is not a suspect classification, 0 9 the rule governing issue preclusion
is subject to strict scrutiny under both due process and equal protection
analyses, because it infringes upon a fundamental right.110
Application of offensive collateral estoppel would treat these classes
of defendants differently. Estoppel would not affect the damage award
rendered against the first class. The jury in this case will be unanimous
on the defendant's liability, whether based on the evidence, or based on
the preclusion of liability through estoppel. In the notation of Part IlI,
the damages award would be equal to D in either case.
However, collateral estoppel would affect the second class. If the
jury were to hear evidence relevant to both liability and damages, it
would render a compromise verdict, denoted aoD, a < 1. If liability were
precluded, evidence on liability may be excluded and a "forced" unani-
mous jury would return a damage award equal to D.
Such interference with a damage verdict presents a Seventh Amend-
ment constitutional issue. In actions where the right to a jury trial is
guaranteed, the Seventh Amendment prohibits interference with the
107 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
108 il at 265.
109 The Supreme Court has recognized classifications involving, for instance, race, Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and national origin, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), as suspect classifications which are subject to strict scrutiny review.
11o Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787 (W.D. Va. 1986).
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jury's ultimate determination of issues of fact, such as damages.111 His-
torically, at the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified, the prevailing
common law, as well as authorities such as Blackstone's Commentaries,
upon which the framers relied, agreed that the question of damages
should be decided by the jury alone. 112 The size of the damage award, as
a question of fact, is within the decisional prerogative of the civil jury.
1 1 3
We argue, therefore, that the distortion of a damage award through offen-
sive application of collateral estoppel burdens a core value of the Sev-
enth Amendment.
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a verdict by an
impartial jury that reflects a representative cross-section of the commu-
nity where the action is brought. Application of offensive collateral es-
toppel distorts the component of the damage verdict that reflects the
community's standards of safety and risk-tolerance. By forcing a = 1,
liability preclusion results in a damage verdict that reflects a higher im-
plicit degree of culpability than society's true aggregate assessment of
defendant's culpability, based on the evidence and society's standards of
risk and safety.
The constitutional issues generated by issue preclusion are analo-
gous to those considered by the courts in cases adjudicating the constitu-
tionality of tort damages caps imposed by a number of states.114 In their
analysis of the constitutionality of such statutes, courts have reasoned
that the statutes created two classes of plaintiffs and distorted the damage
award of one class relative to the amount a jury would render based on
the evidence. The two classes of plaintiffs are those whose actual dam-
ages exceed the cap, and those whose damages fall below the cap, re-
spectively. The capping statutes distort the damage award of the former,
but not the latter. Although some courts have upheld the constitutional-
ity of damage caps challenged under due process or equal protection,
111 See Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp.
781 (W.D. Va. 1986):
Since the assessment of damages is a fact issue committed to the jury for resolution,
a limitation on the performance of that function is a limitation on the role of the jury.
Since the right to a jury as the fact-finder is guaranteed under the Seventh Amend-
ment, it therefore follows that such a limitation is unconstitutional under the provi-
sions of that amendment.
Ild. at 789.
112 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 397 ("([T]he
quantum of damages sustained by [plaintiff] ... is a matter that cannot be [decided] without
the intervention of a jury.").
113 See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("[The] jury properly deter-
mine[s] the question of liability and the extent of the injury by an assessment of damages.
Both are questions of fact.").
114 See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (1987); WASH REV. CODE.
ANN. § 4.56.250 (1987).
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several courts have held that they violate plaintiffs' Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.
In Boyd v. Bulala,115 for instance, the court considered a challenge
to a state statute capping damages, brought under the theory that it de-
nied plaintiffs the right to a trial by jury. Following a Supreme Court
decision stating that "any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care," 116 the Boyd court reasoned
that a cap would interfere with a damage award rendered by the jury
based on evidence presented at trial, and concluded that the statute vio-
lated the Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial.
n7
In summary, I argue that (i) the size of the damage award is subject
to Seventh Amendment protection, and (ii) a rule of law, such as offen-
sive collateral estoppel, that interferes with the size of the damage award
in a way that violates a core value of the Seventh Amendment, burdens a
fundamental right.
A strict scrutiny analysis of the constitutional conflict generated by
issue preclusion requires an examination of the public policy benefits of
collateral estoppel, as well as the causal connection between these bene-
fits and collateral estoppel. The benefits of issue preclusion can be re-
duced to two main policy goals, namely (i) decisional consistency and
(ii) economic efficiency, including conservation of judicial resources and
minimization of litigation expenditure.118 We now consider whether
these are "compelling interests" that pass the strict scrutiny standard.
The right to a jury trial is not an absolute one. It may be waived,
and a court may deny it where the issue under litigation is deemed too
complex for a lay jury to understand.'1 19 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has often shown a willingness to balance constitutional rights against one
another and against other public policy considerations on a cost-benefit
basis. The language of the Fourth Amendment protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, for instance, has been interpreted as an
implied choice between competing policy interests. In United States v.
115 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), affd, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987).
116 Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 788 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
117 See i. at 789-90; see also Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp., 1102, 1107 (D.N.D.
Tex. 1986); Smith v. Dept. of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Carter v. Fibreboard, No.
87-2-03555-7, 24-25, (King County Wa. 1988) (Washington capping statute found to violate
equal protection as well as the right to a jury trial.) In its analysis, the court stated that,
constitutionally, the jury has the ultimate power to find facts based on evidence presented, and
"the amount of damages ... is an ultimate fact." Id. The court concluded that a state statute
capping damages unconstitutionally interferes with the task of the jury to determine the size of
the damages award based on evidence presented. See id.
118 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); see also James F. Flanagan,
Offensive Collateral Estoppel: Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARtz. ST. L. J. 45,
49.
119 See In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (1980).
2000]
548 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:523
Leon,120 the Supreme Court rejected an absolute ban on the use of uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence and stated that each case should be re-
solved on a cost-benefit basis. For instance, the social costs associated
with letting guilty defendants go free should be weighed against the ben-
efit of a search in "good faith" reliance on a warrant.1 21 In Kaiser Indus-
tries Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,122 the Court characterized
collateral estoppel as a balance between due process interests of substan-
tial justice and judicial economy. 123 Even rights that are stated in abso-
lute language, such as the First Amendment, have been subjected to a
balancing approach. 124
A strict scrutiny analysis of collateral estoppel requires a balancing
of the public policy benefits of the doctrine against the value of the Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial, an analysis to which we now turn.
A. DECISIONAL CONSISTENCY
Advocates of collateral estoppel claim that the doctrine promotes
decisional consistency, namely identical adjudication of identical is-
sues. 1' Detractors of the doctrine, on the other hand, have questioned
this claim. 126 We argue in this section that application of offensive col-
lateral estoppel against defendants is likely to undermine decisional con-
sistency precisely in cases where it is also most likely to offend a
constitutional principle.
As an illustration of the class of cases where issue preclusion under-
mines decisional consistency, consider a product liability action. The
injured person sues and obtains a judgment that the product is defective.
The evidence on liability is such that the jury is not unanimous, and
renders a damage award which we write, in usual notation, as a*D, a < 1.
Subsequently, the identical product causes an identical harm in a differ-
ent jurisdiction where the community has an identical distribution of risk
attitudes. The ideal of decisional consistency would compel an identical
120 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
121 Id. at 907-08.
122 515 F.2d 964, 976-77 (discussing Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 321 (1971)).
123 See id.
124 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). "Content-neutral"
limitations on speech, for instance, are constitutional if "designed to serve a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." Id.
at 48; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985)
('We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.")
(citations omitted); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (balancing the state's right to use
deadly force against a fleeing felon and an individual's interest in life); New York v. Ferber
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that the evil of child pornography outweighed the First Amend-
ment rights of a purveyor of such material).
125 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96 (1980).
126 See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 110, at 52.
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judgment, namely a verdict of liability and a damages award of aoD in
the second action. If, however, offensive collateral estoppel were applied
against defendant on the issue of liability in the second suit, it would
force a = 1 and the expected damages award would be equal to D. If
offensive collateral estoppel were not applied in the second action, an
appropriately selected jury could be expected to render a "consistent"
verdict, namely a verdict imposing liability and rendering a damage
award of a*D.127 The difference between D and aoD measures not only
the unconstitutional distortion of the damage award, but also demon-
strates how severely decisional consistency has been undermined. This
differential is a result of the use of offensive collateral estoppel to force
jury unanimity where unanimity is not justified by the defendant's degree
of culpability.
The anomalous result is that (i) issue preclusion is promoted as fur-
thering the judicial ideal of decisional consistency, yet (ii) defendants
who pay the constitutional price of issue preclusion are not only the rela-
tively less culpable ones, but they do not even get the purported benefit:
They constitute the class of defendants for whom consistency is under-
mined. Even if we accept that application of offensive collateral estoppel
promotes consistency in some cases, it undermines it in others. There-
fore, there is no clear causal connection between estoppel and
consistency.
B. JUDICIAL ECONOMY
Judicial economy is the second major public policy benefit claimed
by proponents of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel allows parties to
avoid relitigating an issue that has already been decided. This reduces
private litigation expenditure and promotes judicial economy and effi-
ciency by alleviating the caseloads of the courts. Strict scrutiny analysis
would balance this economic interest against litigating parties' Seventh
Amendment right.
The Court often balances constitutional rights against one another
and against a variety of public policy considerations; however, the judici-
ary has been more protective of constitutional rights when the opposing
interest involved pure economic or efficiency considerations. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Illinois,128 that:
the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say.., the Bill of
127 An individual jury will not reflect the full diversity of the community, but if it is
selected appropriately, it will render an expected damage award that reflects this diversity of
risk attitudes, namely an amount equal to a.D.
128 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (discussed in Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REv. 592, 596 n.26 (1985)).
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Rights ... [was] designed to protect the fragile values of
a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praisewor-
thy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.129
The Court has held in other cases that saving money is not a com-
pelling state interest that justifies the government's abrogation of consti-
tutional rights.130 Even if a state had a compelling fiscal need, a remedy
that would abrogate a constitutional right should be used only as a last
resort. 1
31
Commentators and the courts have been especially reluctant to ap-
ply cost-benefit balancing to the Sixth and Seventh Amendment rights to
a jury trial. A recurring rationale is that the framers of the Constitution
have balanced the costs and benefits of the right to a jury trial and re-
solved it in favor of said right, and it is therefore inappropriate to repeat
such a balancing. For example, Judge Frank Easterbrook writes "[o]ther
constitutional provisions also instruct the government to put costs and
benefits aside. The seventh and eleventh amendments enshrine historical
treatments of important problems, though these solutions may be quite
inefficient."1
32
A series of cases have directly addressed the appropriate constitu-
tional balance between the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial
and economic benefits. On June 12, 1986, the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts temporarily suspended civil jury trials because
of inadequate funding from Congress. The constitutionality of this pro-
posed "jury rationing" was successfully challenged by civil litigants in
two cases, Arnster v. United States District Court133 and Hobson v.
Brennan.13
4
The Hobson court held that denial of a civil jury trial in anticipation
of budgetary problems would violate the Seventh Amendment. 35 The
Armster court directly addressed the constitutionality of the temporary
129 Id. at 656 (footnote omitted).
130 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding that state government's fiscal
interest does not justify burden on the right to interstate travel).
131 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (stating that even a financial
emergency barely justifies infringing First Amendment rights).
132 Frank H. Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARv. L. Rav. 622,
623 n.4; see also Earl C. Dudley, Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Ap-
proach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1091-92 (1993) ("With
respect to these rights, the Constitution has resolved the cost-benefit analysis in favor of jury
trials in serious criminal (and most civil) cases .... ").
133 792 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1986).
134 637 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1986).
135 Subsequent to Annster, Odden v. O'Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707 (N.D. 1990), considered
the constitutionality of a moratorium on civil jury trials for a period of 18 months, imposed for
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suspension and, likewise, held that the temporary suspension violated the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court held unambiguously
that a constitutional right should not be compromised for economic gain,
even when apparently compelled by cost-benefit considerations. 136 This
applies especially to the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial,
137
and applies even to a temporary deprivation of, or an attempt to limit, a
party's Seventh Amendment right.
138
In conclusion, the analysis in Part V shows that application of offen-
sive collateral estoppel to preclude liability does not pass the strict scru-
tiny test of constitutionality. There is no clear causal connection between
offensive collateral estoppel and decisional consistency. In fact, I have
demonstrated that preclusion often undermines decisional consistency.
Furthermore, the purported benefit of judicial economy does not justify
an erosion of the Seventh Amendment. Part VI discusses public policy
implications of this analysis.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This article has presented a theory that would impose constitutional
limitations on the application of offensive collateral estoppel in product
liability litigation. Such limitations may affect the economics of product
liability litigation and impede Full Faith and Credit recognition and en-
forcement of product liability verdicts across state lines. Furthermore,
the theory sheds light on the judicial interpretation of compromise
verdicts.
A. ECONOMICS OF LTmGATION
A constitutional conflict originates from the fact that offensive ap-
plication of collateral estoppel may force a jury to render a damage ver-
dict without hearing evidence on liability. This constitutional risk is also
budgetary reasons. See id. at 709. Relying heavily on Armster, the O'Keefe court held that the
moratorium violated petitioner's state constitutional right to a civil jury trial. See id. at 710.
136 See Arnster, 792 F.2d at 1429:
[T]he availability of constitutional rights does not vary with the rise and fall of ac-
count balances in the Treasury. Our basic liberties cannot be offered and withdrawn
as 'budget crunches' come and go .... In short, constitutional rights do not turn on
the political mood of the moment, the outcome of cost/benefit analyses or the results
of economic or fiscal calculations.
Id.
137 See id. ('There is no price tag on [the civil jury] system, or on any other constitution-
ally-provided right.").
138 See id. at 1430 ("A temporary deprivation of a right, or a limitation on it, may violate
the Constitution as well.") (emphasis added); see also Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722
F.2d 1542, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("So long as the Seventh Amendment stands, the right to a
jury trial should not be rationed.. . ") (emphasis added).
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present in other litigation techniques that force separate determination of
liability and damages, such as trial bifurcation.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that a court may
order separate trials on issues such as liability and damages to promote
economy, convenience, and avoid prejudice. 139 The rule has most often
been used to bifurcate liability and damages, and in some jurisdictions
bifurcation is a matter of norm and routine.140 Under a rule formulated
in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,14 1 issues such as
liability and damages may be tried separately if they are separable and
sufficiently distinct so that separate trials will not lead to an injustice.142
Empirical evidence indicates that bifurcation does save time and
money. In a statistical study of bifurcated trials, Zeisel and Callahan
143
found that, in their sample, bifurcated trials lasted an average of 4.0 days
compared to 4.7 days for unitary trials. They controlled for a selection
effect, i.e. the possibility that particular types of cases may be more
likely to be selected for bifurcation. The authors estimate that a court
could save 21 % of trial time by bifurcating all of its personal injury
cases. 1' Bifurcation saves time when the defendant prevails at the lia-
bility phase and the trial ends. In addition, Zeisel and Callahan found
that bifurcation encouraged settlement when the plaintiff prevailed dur-
ing the liability phase of a bifurcated trial. Zeisel and Callahan report
four additional positive consequences of bifurcation. According to their
results, bifurcation reduced juror deliberation time, did not affect fre-
quency of jury waivers, left the percentage of hung juries more or less
constant, and did not diminish the pre-trial settlement rate. 145 Further-
more, a 1989 poll reports that 80% of federal judges and 77% of state
judges surveyed believe that bifurcation had a positive influence on the
fairness of the outcomes and expedited settlements.
146
139 FED. R. Crv. PRo. 42(b) ("The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid preju-
dice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a sepa-
rate trial... of any separate issue... always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment.... ."); see also R.S. HAYDOCK ET At.., FUNDAMENTALS
oF PRnERmi. LTGATION § 12.3.6 (3d ed. 1994).
140 See HAYDOCK Er AL. supra note 139, at § 12.3.6.
141 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931); see also Franchi Constr. Co. v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,
580 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978). Separate trials of distinct issues before different juries would
offend the Seventh Amendment only when the issues are so interwoven that separating them
would deny defendant a fair trial. See id. at 7-8.
142 See id.
143 Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis,
76 HARv. L. REv. 1606, 1612 (1963).
144 See id. at 1616.
145 See id. at 1621-23.
146 See Symposium, Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Fed-
eral Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B. U. L.
REv. 731,743, 745 tbl.5.6 (1989); see also Vogel, The Issues of Liability and Damages Should
be Separated for the Purposes of Trial, ABA Ins. Neg. & Compensation Sec. 265 (1960).
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In practice, the issues of liability and damages may be heard by
separate juries in bifurcated cases, 147 and courts have held that this prac-
tice does not violate the Seventh Amendment. 148 In spite of the blessing
of the courts and evidence of the positive economic impact of bifurca-
tion, the analysis in this article would question the constitutionality of
such a procedure. If bifurcation were held to be unconstitutional, as the
analysis of this article suggests, the result will be an increase in the cost
of litigation, both to private parties, as well as to the judiciary. Accord-
ing to empirical studies cited in this Part, possible consequences include
increased juror deliberation time, reduced incentives to settle during trial,
and greater litigation expenses, including increased demands on re-
sources of the courts.
B. JUDGMENT RECOGNTION AND ENFORCEMENT
An extension of the analysis in this article would limit recognition
and enforcement of product liability judgments across state lines. The
principles of Full Faith and Credit govern the decision to recognize and
enforce a judgment rendered in another jurisdiction.149 Under these prin-
ciples, a jurisdiction must give the judgment from another jurisdiction
the same recognition and respect it would receive in the jurisdiction
where the judgment was rendered. 150 A state can refuse to recognize the
judgment of another state only when recognition may offend a constitu-
tional principle. For instance, violation of due process by the first court
due to a lack of personal jurisdiction may justify non-recognition of its
judgment.' 51 The analysis in this article provides a constitutional foun-
dation for refusal to recognize the judgment of another state when the
judgment has depended on the use of offensive collateral estoppel, bifur-
cation of liability and damages or any other procedure that allowed the
determination of liability and damages by separate juries.
147 See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9"h Cir. 1961).
148 See, e.g., Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931)
(concluding issue separation does not substantively affect the right to a jury trial); Moss v.
Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 27 (6th Cir. 1965), cited in HAYDOCK Er AL. supra
note 139, at § 12.3.6.
149 States must recognize judgments from sister states to the same extent as the state
where judgment was rendered. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § I (codified as 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738
(1994)).
150 Although the Constitutional provision is stated in terms of recognition of judgments
among the states, the principles of full faith and credit are pervasive in the U.S. legal system
and generally apply to recognition of judgments among state courts as well as federal and state
courts. See FaRaomwDriT Er AL. supra note 90, at 607, § 14.15.
151 See id. at 694.
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C. COMPROMISE VERDICT
Courts have generally been hostile to compromise verdicts, such as
a compromise damage verdict negotiated in return for a liability verdict.
In Simmons v. Fish,152 for instance, the court ordered a new trial after the
jury returned what appeared to be just such a compromise verdict on
damages. 153 In Taylor v. Hawkinson,154 the court characterized a verdict
that included a compromise damage amount as inconclusive of defend-
ant's liability.155 Moreover, the Restatement of Judgments refers to
compromise judgments as imperfect judgments. 156 The courts do ac-
knowledge, however, the effectiveness of a compromise verdict in
achieving finality in an action 157 and will not set aside a prior verdict just
because it was based on a compromise.
158
A distinction should be made between verdicts where the compro-
mise is motivated by sympathy, e.g. for an injured plaintiff or an unin-
sured co-defendant, and a verdict where the compromise is motivated by
a reconciliation of rational disagreement among jurors with a diversity of
general biases. The former type of compromise is the result of case-
specific bias and violates the constitutional requirement of impartiality.
The courts' concern with the validity of this type of liability verdict is
entirely justified. The latter type of compromise verdict is, as argued in
this article, the inevitable consequence of a constitutionally diverse jury.
Such a compromise verdict is a legitimate verdict that reflects society's
judgment of the strength of the evidence against a defendant. It is there-
fore inappropriate to characterize such a verdict as "imperfect" or
"inconclusive."
Courts usually refuse to give preclusive effect to compromise ver-
dicts because of judicial skepticism towards the validity of such ver-
dicts. 159 While I agree with the courts' reluctance to allow preclusion, I
152 97 N.E. 102 (Mass. 1912).
153 See id.; see also McCoRICK, supra note 67, at § 19.
154 306 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1957).
155 The court characterized the verdict as a compromise based on evidence such as a
damages award substantially less than special damages. Id. at 799.
156 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (4), (5) (1982); see also J. Sanders,
From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 75 (1993).
157 See Moore v. Schneider, 238 P. 81, 84 (Cal. 1925); Partridge v. Shepard, 12 P. 480,
484 (Cal. 1886); FitzGerald v. Terminal Dev. Co., 53 P.2d 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925), cited in
Taylor v. Hawkinson, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (Cal. 1957).
158 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943); United States v. Gipson,
553 F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977); H. S. Suskin, Collateral Estoppel and the Compromise
Verdict, 18 International Society of Barristers Quarterly 354, 354 n.4 (1983).
159 See Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Taylor v.
Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (1957); see also Braselton v. Clearfield State
Bank, 606 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1979); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d
532 (2d Cir. 1965); Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Lundeen v.
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do not agree with their rationale. A compromise verdict may be valid
and constitutional if it reflects the aggregate judgment of a cross-section
of the community that the jury represents.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article presents a legal and policy analysis of issue preclusion
in product liability litigation. Application of offensive collateral estoppel
to preclude litigation of the issue of liability invades the constitutional
authority of the civil jury to decide the size of a damages award based on
evidence presented at trial. Strict scrutiny analysis of the public policy
interests of issue preclusion indicates that preclusion of liability is an
unconstitutional burden on a fundamental right, namely the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.
The analysis has significant public policy implications. A constitu-
tional limitation on issue preclusion can be expected to affect the eco-
nomics of product liability litigation, as well as the recognition and
enforcement of product liability judgments. The analysis also sheds new
light on the judicial interpretation of compromise verdicts.
Hackbarth, 171 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1969); see also H.S. Suskin, Collateral Estoppel and the
Compromise Verdict, 18 International Society of Barristers Quarterly 354, 354 (1983).
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